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Abstract 
 
This policy brief explores how innovation becomes an increasingly important topic in international 
relations, with a deep impact on collaboration as well as on competition between countries. It analyses 
how the patterns of techno-economic change lead to changes in the global distribution of innovative 
activities around the world. It outlines three near future scenarios of the international politics of innovation. 
The first, called “populism and protectionism” describes an international environment which is becoming 
dominated by populist and nationalist tendencies. The second outlines the consequences of an approach 
of “innovation as a global public good”, in which ultimately everybody benefits, and global collaboration 
is the dominant model. The third scenario is called “bottom-up innovation” and describes what happens 
to the international dimensions when large international firms and the regions in which they are based 
become the dominant forces. Together these scenarios describe the range of potential developments 
over the next 10 years. The final paragraph discusses what Europe can and should do in its external 
relations to provide adequate answers to the forces outlined in the three scenarios. It results in a vision, 
which is laid down in four policy directions: a) the European “open” model of research and innovation 
should remain the starting point; b) Europe should actively seek to build level playing fields for 
commercial, technological and innovation powers; c) Europe should identify and foster its technological 
strengths and the critical technologies that need special attention, both in offensive and defensive ways; 
and d) Europe must identify and spread the key social values and goals (e.g. in relation to quality of life, 
quality of labour, culture including privacy, and sustainability) that it wants to pursue in its internal and 
external innovation policies and collaborations. This vision must guide the development of an 
international innovation policy and the work of innovation diplomats.   
 
3 
Introduction 
 
This policy brief seeks to develop a framework for analysing how foreign policies and diplomatic actions 
may influence the strength of European innovation and related businesses. It explores the 
consequences of developments in science, technology and innovation in relation to changes in the 
political and economic relations between nations for Europe’s external relations and diplomatic 
activities. It explores how a “new technological order” and the recent falling apart of what appeared to 
be a relatively stable world order, force Europe to reconsider its international role and activities. It will 
first look at the changes that characterised the past 10 years. This will be followed by 3 scenarios that 
together describe the forces which are likely to determine the near future. A final paragraph discusses 
the consequences for Europe’s international policy actions and gives advice for future policy directions.1  
     
Why should Europe worry about innovation and international relations? 
 
The second half of the 20th Century was a period of steadily growing globalisation of firms and growing 
interconnections between national economies. With the rise of new and cheap means of communication 
(fax machines and later the Internet) and changes in transportation (e.g. containers) since 1980, it 
became increasingly easy to coordinate global activities in production and in trade (Ortiz-Ospina & 
Roser, 2018). Europe benefited from this globalisation by amassing a large trade surplus2. Globalisation 
was generally seen as beneficial for everybody. Optimisation of industrial production at a global scale 
created huge growth opportunities in South-East Asia, China and South Korea. The flow of cheaper 
products to Europe and the US contributed to increasing living standards in these regions. 
Rather suddenly, the picture changed. Between 2000 and 2005, China and Russia, after more than a 
decade of internal (re-)orientation, became more self-aware actors in international politics. Populism 
grew in Europe and the US. Following the financial crisis in 2008, foreign direct investment, which had 
grown from 4% of global GDP in 1990 to 23% in 2007, fell to just 6% about 10 years later. For the last 
five years growth in trade barely outpaced global GDP growth (Lund & Tyson, 2018). The rise of populist 
politics in Europe and the US, and to a somewhat lesser extent in Asia, has changed the political 
discourse about globalisation and related policy actions completely. In the West, globalisation is seen 
as the cause of many problems, like job insecurity, growth of low-income jobs, or no jobs at all, 
unwanted migration and migratory labour, and a general lack of opportunities to improve one’s living 
conditions. The latest implication (mid-2018) is an outright trade-war started by US President Trump 
based on “America First” thinking and attempting to reduce the huge US trade deficit. 
Techno-economic change 
Without any doubt, ICTs are the most transformative technologies of the past 50 years. Technological 
developments have driven the costs of communication and processing of information down while at the 
same time improving on speed and processing capacity. In the process, demand for their key enabling 
technologies has grown at a very fast pace. This holds for networking (e.g. speed, capacity, mobility, 
accessibility), processing (again speed and capacity but also size and weight), capturing data 
(sensoring, measurement) and for storage of information. This has contributed to ICTs becoming 
ubiquitous, entering all sectors of society and (almost) all aspects of personal life (World Economic 
Forum, 2015). ICTs are also playing a key role in other fields of technology (e.g. nano-, bio- or 
environmental technologies), determining their speed of development and the characteristics of 
applications. Most influential are two developments which both have firm anchors in the basic 
technologies. The first is networking of almost all aspects of life and the second is availability of data. 
The vision of seamlessly integrated ubiquitous computing will remain important over and (most likely) 
beyond the next decade (IEEE, 2014). Demand for faster and more flexible networking, mobility, 
                                                      
 
1 The work on which this policy brief is based has been reported in two publications (Leijten, Exploring the future of Innovation 
Diplomacy, 2017) (Leijten, Innovation and International Relations:directions for EU diplomacy, 2019). Extensive quotations from 
these publications are used.  
2 “… the largest surplus for international trade in goods and services was recorded by the EU (+€304 billion in 2016) ahead of 
China (+€226 bn), while the United States had the largest deficit (-€456 bn). (DESTATIS, Statistisches Bundesambt, 2018) 
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processing and storage capacity will continue to increase at exponential pace, mainly because it allows 
doing things easier, faster, simpler and at lower cost. New types of applications building on machine-
to-machine communications (e.g. self-driving cars), internet of things, autonomous robots, new display 
and interfacing technologies (including virtual reality, augmented reality and telepresence), artificial 
intelligence, speech and language processing, etc. will add to this increasing demand. 
The second feature of ICTs also has become a dominant force in society: the capabilities of making 
data available and accessible, and of analysing them in such a way that they can be presented as 
sensible information. Nowadays, all kinds of human and non-human processes leave behind an 
enormous trail of data. Data-gathering, processing and analysis are expected to make major steps 
forward in the coming years, mainly through increased data-collection (e.g. the internet of things), better 
data availability, increased computing capabilities, and possibly also through the development and use 
of new automated learning systems and analytical algorithms (Artificial Intelligence). 
The further development of networking and the growth of data will be accompanied by several societal 
challenges. Some of these challenges will be highly political (Who has access to what? How open or 
closed and dedicated will the networks be?) and may undermine the openness that has driven internet 
developments over the past decades. Trust will become an increasingly important issue when we start 
to depend on machine-to-machine communication (like in self-driving cars), but even more in relation 
to the personal data-trail. Networked technologies, their applications and the underlying data- and 
information-systems have become vital for the basic functioning of society and, in many cases have 
also become vital for our personal lives. But they also have led to changes in the structure of economy 
and society. 
One of the key issues for international relations is that technological power (and the related social, 
political and economic power) is not evenly distributed around the globe. Such powers are concentrated 
in innovation ecosystems, hubs, clusters or megaregions, to mention just a few of the terms that are 
used in the literature to describe geographical concentrations of technological power. The combination 
of networked technologies and data leads at the same time to a stronger concentration of powers and 
to a deeper penetration of these powers into economic, social, and political life. In many countries, this 
is a reason for putting technology higher on the political agenda. But when this happens, we can also 
observe great differences in the way national policies want to regulate technology-based power. Even 
in the single European market, we can see major differences in the ways in which, for example, Uber 
and AirBnB are regulated. The regulatory differences may become even bigger when so-called ethical 
issues start to play a role (e.g. in relation to embryonic stem cells) (Regulation of stem cell research in 
Europe, n.d.). These developments contribute to the growth of an international field of negotiated 
collaboration or, in some cases, outright competition or power struggles. 
Competition and power struggles 
New technologies are thus putting innovation more firmly on the international agenda. Of course, issues 
of technology catch-up still play a major role in international relations, in particular for developing and/or 
lagging countries. But with the globalisation of networked technologies, these networked technologies 
themselves, their applications and the people and organisations that use them in all domains of society, 
have become one of the prime factors to drive changes in foreign relations and in foreign policies around 
the world.   
The technologies that helped to build global networks have done their work so well that the global value 
chains that were mostly built over the past 30-40 years, have now reached maturity (Lund & Tyson, 
2018). It has become difficult to find further efficiency gains by splitting production processes in ever 
smaller parts that each benefit from favourable conditions in specific localities. The maturity of value 
chains contributes at least partly to improving the conditions for re-shoring (e.g. bringing production 
back from China to Europe or the US) (Kinkel, 2015). As the massive off-shoring of production to China 
is a factor that drives current populist and nationalist tendencies (more so in the US than in Europe), 
the fact that it has become difficult to find further efficiency gains by another relocation may very well 
make the call for re-shoring more realistic than it was 15 years ago. Reshoring may also be helped by 
the further penetration of ICTs in the core of production processes through new technologies such as 
on-demand-production and/or 3D-printing. However, re-shoring does not automatically lead to growth 
and a stronger competitive position. Therefore, it should be firmly based on innovations. Indeed, very 
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often re-shoring goes together with a higher capital intensity, with higher levels of automation and with 
fewer jobs, to counter-balance for lower wages and other advantages elsewhere. Reshoring thus 
requires powerful political action. But it also requires careful political action. Globalisation has led to 
strong and often vital interdependencies in value chains. Disruption of even a small link in a supply-
chain may cause serious problems in delivering the final products. In other words, reshoring may be 
presented as a solution to vulnerabilities (decreasing interdependencies with other places in the world), 
but it needs to be done is such a way that all critical elements in the value chain are considered. 
Politicians who want to follow this path risk resistance from firms and from other nations that depend 
on the value chain. They risk contributing to growing international tensions around the availability of 
specific technological knowledge and products.  
In addition to their impacts on economic growth and competition, the new technologies also have a 
more direct political impact in international relations. Electronic warfare and other disruptive actions, 
spying through hacking or hidden applications, influencing politics and voting through social media 
interventions and fake news are all examples of how the new technologies may help a state to intervene 
in political processes of another state at a scale not seen before.  
The location of activities in specific value chains and thus the location of innovative capacities has 
become subject of international power struggles. The growing dependencies of society on an 
increasingly wider range of technologies and related vulnerabilities are contributing these struggles. 
Globalisation and international collaboration are no longer the norm.  
The problem for Europe 
Globalisation and international collaboration were the norm up to around the start of the 2008 financial 
crisis. Many international governance bodies that helped to facilitate and promote such international 
collaboration were established in the second half of the 20th century. Over the years almost all these 
organisations took issues of technological development and innovation on their agendas. Many 
countries around the world established special offices or stationed so-called science and (later) 
innovation attachés in their embassies. Their main role was to inform and to explore opportunities for 
collaboration (Leijten, Exploring the future of Innovation Diplomacy, 2017). Gradually this role had also 
been taken up by the representations of the European Union, in this case focusing mainly on 
collaboration with the European Framework Programmes for research and innovation.   
Ten years after the start of the financial crisis, the picture looks completely different. The international 
governance bodies such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organisation are rapidly losing 
authority and impact. Among the major players in the global arena US politics has made a significant 
turn away from internationalism towards a transactional approach. China has become an active player 
in the global arena with a keen eye for self-interest and a strategy which could lead to technological 
dominance and making an increasingly larger number of countries dependent (e.g. through loans and 
debts in relation to the Belt and Road Initiative). 
Europe may still be seen as a supporter of international agenda setting and collaborative action, but 
this position is increasingly weakened by internal fights and ad hoc reactions to external pressures.3 
Facing the tendencies discussed above, Europe lacks a consistent future-oriented policy view to guide 
its international policies. This is particularly problematic for innovation related issues and policies, 
because in this case the division of labour between Commission and Member States is unclear. In 
general, trade and commercial policies, which are highly relevant for (the diffusion of) innovation, are in 
the hands of the Commission. Many other relevant policy areas, such as environment, transport and 
energy, are shared competences primarily in the hands of the European Union. Foreign policies, 
security and research are also shared, but primarily in the hands of the Member States. Industry and 
education are fully in the hands of the Member States. Science, but even more so, technology and 
innovation have strong linkages to all these policy areas. Europe urgently needs a vision about its 
international science, technology and innovation policy position, to align with the Member States (not 
to mention the stakeholders), to clarify the division of labour and to guide the international activities 
from Commission and Member States.   
                                                      
 
3 This is, for example, illustrated by the development of Europe’s position about collaboration with China in the field of solar PV 
over the past 10 years (Gehrt, 2018). 
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Foreign policies and science, technology and innovation: three scenarios  
 
The basic premises for this policy brief are that the growing importance of innovation and innovation 
policies in foreign relations will drive changes in three areas:  
- It brings new issues to the domain of science diplomacy which drive the change to innovation 
diplomacy. The importance of national economic interests in the field is growing and puts issues 
like critical technologies, trade in high tech products, IP ownership and protection, and 
standardisation on the foreign policy agenda. 
- It leads to changing stakeholder configurations. Firms, their representative organisations, NGOs 
and local/regional public bodies are becoming increasingly important players in the domain of 
foreign policy. 
- It leads to changes in the set of policy instruments and working methods relevant for STI diplomacy. 
A wide range of economic and social policy instruments relating to economic power is added to the 
field.   
 
How these changes may take shape in in foreign economic policy and innovation diplomacy is explored 
in three scenarios. These scenarios build upon the forces that were analysed and described in the 
previous paragraph. The first scenario reads as a direct reaction to the combined populist and 
nationalist tendencies and is called “populism and protectionism”. The second could be read as a 
continuation of the strong internationalisation forces of the recent past in which innovation and growth 
are there for the benefit of all. In this scenario innovation is a “global public good”, which also provides 
the title of the scenario. The third scenario builds on a mixed set of societal and technological 
tendencies, which largely escape official politics, although they are in many cases supported by 
innovation policies. It is about the strength of networking externalities and the resulting push for 
globalisation by firms which operate in the new technologies. It goes together with the growth of the 
role of global companies and of the regions in which these companies operate in international relations. 
And it is about the consequences of user driven innovations in sustainable development, urban 
development, employment and other fields. This scenario is called “bottom-up innovation”. The 
scenarios do not intend to describe what will happen, but rather to explore what may happen when a 
specific force or tendency becomes dominant. In the real world, all three forces that define the scenarios 
will be present at the same time in a more or less stronger degree.  
Scenario 1: Populism and protectionism  
The first scenario is a direct response to populist and nationalist tendencies in politics. The difference 
between populism and progressivism does not follow the usual right-left distinctions in politics. The US 
based think-tank the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation describes the distinction between 
what they have called Tech Populism and Tech Progressivism in the following table (Atkinson, Castro, 
& McQuinn, 2015): 
 
Tech Populism Tech Progressivism 
Appeals to emotion Appeals to reason 
Motivated by self-interest Motivated by societal benefit 
Distrusts the system Trusts the system 
Focuses on possible downsides Focuses on benefits of progress 
Distrusts government and business Sees business and government as extensions of 
collective action benefiting society 
Sees problems as “us versus them” Sees problems as opportunities to work together 
 Table 1: The differences between populism and progressivism (source ITIF) 
 
Protectionism seems to go hand in hand with populism. The focus on the national economy results in 
defensive or protective policies like raising import tariffs on certain products, limiting international 
scientific and/or technological collaboration, preventing the take-over of national “icon-companies” by 
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foreign investors, requiring local content to get access to markets, and many other policies.4 Such policy 
measures are likely to have considerable impacts on innovation. The effects on innovation diffusion 
around the world will be almost immediate. Countries with high barriers to diffusion of innovations, 
resulting from protective measures, will have to invest more to realise these innovations themselves. 
But in the innovation averse political environment, which comes with populism, it is unlikely that 
expenditures for innovation can be raised. Generally, a slow-down of innovation and growth is to be 
expected. Examples of innovation related foreign policies, which are inspired by populism and 
protectionism, can now be found almost everywhere in the world. We expect a growing pressure on 
foreign (economic) policy and the diplomatic services to become more defensive and driven by short-
term self-interest, certainly compared to the period which lies behind us, in which they had a strong 
focus on seeking collaboration agreements and alliances. 
Scenario 2: Innovation as a global public good 
The second scenario can be read as a continuation of the strong internationalisation forces of the recent 
past in which innovation and growth are there for the benefit of all. There are two important views on 
this. The first one is the generic perspective which says that innovation builds on knowledge which is 
largely public and global, even if certain applications are privately appropriated and protected by patents 
(Stiglitz, 1999). It is the basis for companies to build the global value chains that deliver the global 
diffusion of innovations. The second perspective focuses on the development of innovations needed to 
solve global problems, for instance, as stated in the UN sustainable development goals (UN Department 
of Social and Economic Affairs, n.d.). International collaboration is needed to build the necessary 
knowledge, develop the technologies and realise these innovations.  
Both perspectives have in the recent past led to major efforts to build international collaborations and 
institutions, partly with a global reach and partly with a focus on connecting specific regions, not to 
speak of the numerous bilateral agreements. Most of these are of public origin and nature, but not 
exclusively. There are quite a lot of private sector initiatives that at least partly work in the perspective 
of innovation as a global public good, by exchanging experiences, joint skills development, etc.5 Next 
to fully private initiatives there are also mixed public-private collaborations. The global challenges 
perspective has led to a large number of international initiatives to solve for example health and food 
problems. Together these initiatives cover the complexity of functions that need to be present in 
innovation systems, from developing the visons and organising funding to managing the diffusion of 
innovations. 
At national or multilateral government level a few different models are “under development” and deserve 
further discussion. Consider the cases of China, Europe and the USA.  
With its Open Science, Open Innovation and Open to the World approach the official EU-policy is 
without any doubt the most idealistic among the three examples. This policy is entirely building upon 
the vision of science and innovation as a global public good. And it is trying to spread the vision and 
approach.   
The US has for many years been an important initiator and supporter of the global governance 
institutions. And even when the Trump administration seems to be dominated by a rhetoric of retreat 
and self-interest, there are abundant signs that the US wants to continue its policies of innovation as a 
global public good. But it is also clear that the US wants something (mainly manufacturing jobs) in 
exchange. The private sector which is seeking to bring innovations to global markets is an important 
driver for presenting innovation as a global public good in the US. 
As a relative newcomer in the world of science, technology and innovation, China is still seeking its 
place, but it seems to be determined that this should be a leading place. It has a keen eye for self-
interest and is not afraid to use its powers to build on its own strengths. As research and innovation 
gradually have become more important drivers in the Chinese economy, China has increasingly 
become aware of the importance to build strong relations with the rest of the world, to access knowledge 
                                                      
 
4 For several years now, the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) makes an almost annual and worldwide 
overview of protective policy measures that work as barriers against innovation (Cory, 2018 (January 22)).. 
5 The European Industrial Research Managers Association (EIRMA) which brings together the R&D and Innovation managers 
from about 80 leading companies, is an example of this approach. 
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and experience necessary for building its own strengths, and to help to create increasingly wealthy and 
advanced markets that may adopt innovative Chinese products and services. 
In other words, there are sufficient tendencies in different countries or world regions to make the vision 
of “innovation as a global public good” a viable force, which can have considerable influence on the 
spread of innovations and related growth around the world.  
Scenario 3: Bottom-up innovation 
The third scenario builds on a few widely diverse societal and technological tendencies, of which the 
consequences are not primarily the result of official politics.  
This scenario supposes that the strength of networking externalities and the resulting push for 
globalisation in many of the new technologies of today and the foreseeable future is becoming a 
dominant societal force. Sectors are dominated by a small number of large firms with a global reach. 
To preserve their monopolies or oligopolies these firms make considerable efforts to influence politics. 
They have their private diplomatic services (public affairs).  
Another tendency that shapes this scenario is the growth of user driven innovations in sustainable 
development, urban development, (self-)employment and other fields, that will become very strong 
forces for change. Social networking allows global linkage and mutual strengthening of these initiatives.  
The third scenario also recognises that local politics is better than national government in picking up 
these initiatives and at incorporating them into their local policies. The vision that is behind this, as 
expressed in concepts like clusters and innovation eco-systems, may turn local government into a 
global actor, by facilitating the exchange of experiences with similar initiatives around the world or by 
facilitating connections with regions which contribute to vital parts of the local value network. This brings 
local and regional governments into the domain of international relations, economic and innovation 
diplomacy.  
In the bottom-up innovation scenario the role of national government is mostly one of following and then 
supporting the local societal tendencies and strengthening the key actors. 
 
Recommendations: policy directions for science, technology and innovation in Europe’s international 
relations  
 
In the search for the elements which should define its international and global role, Europe must take 
account of these scenarios and their interplay. Europe has a history of searching for these elements, 
both as a general political power as well as specifically in the field of science, technology and innovation. 
This search can be found in several different vision and scenario documents, from the European 
Commission, from EU funded research consortia, from interest organisations and from think tanks.6 
The vision document of the current European Commission shows that at present Europe’s starting point 
is firmly anchored in the “innovation as global public good” scenario: ´Fostering international 
cooperation in research and innovation is a strategic priority for the European Union so that we can 
access the latest knowledge and the best talent worldwide, tackle global societal challenges more 
effectively, create business opportunities in new and emerging markets, and use science diplomacy as 
an influential instrument of external policy.’ (European Commission, 2016, p. 1) 
Is such a strategy good enough when it is, for example, confronted with the Chinese strategies of 
technological leadership on the one hand and the Belt and Road initiative7 on the other? Or with the 
international strategy of the US, which seems to go in the direction of a pragmatic transactional 
approach? Is it strong enough to face populist and nationalist tendencies within the Union itself and 
elsewhere in the world? And is it strong enough to provide a framework in which bottom-up innovation 
can flourish?  
It can be, but only if it is matched by a set of other policies that address issues related to the changing 
characteristics of competition in the international arena and that address issues brought forward by the 
                                                      
 
6 An abundance of such documents can easily be found online. 
7 Even when the Belt and Road initiative lacks systematic translation into Chinese policy, it convinces other actors, including 
the European Commission, to consider taking action.  
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populist and nationalist movements. The following outlines a few starting points or policy directions that 
Europe should follow in its international innovation policies and which must guide its diplomatic actions. 
These points are not new, on the contrary, some are strongly present in European external policies for 
quite some time, but in a rather disconnected way. 
 
1) To start with, Europe should continue to foster, maintain and spread the message of open science, 
open innovation and remain open to the world. It clearly outlines the intentions and directions of 
Europe when it enters the international or global arena: Europe is seeking open collaboration to the 
benefit of all participants, taking international solidarity and the perspective of innovation as a global 
public good as its starting point. This starting point needs to be complemented with at least three 
other policy initiatives.  
2) Europe should increase efforts to create a global level playing field, including free trade, free 
exchange of knowledge and of innovative products and services. Part of this is to take care of 
reciprocity in exchanging information, technology and innovations. There might be good reasons to 
transfer technology under favourable conditions to developing and/or partner countries, but the 
potential consequences in the home market may justify regulation of such transfers and the setting 
of limits to the freedom of companies to freely move their (technology) assets to other countries. In 
the same vain, the development and implementation of Europe’s “Open Science Cloud” (facilitating 
the exchange of data and research tools) must include a number of measures, which regulate 
collaboration with global partners (Science/Business Network, 2018).   
3) In the third place, it is necessary to identify and increase awareness of Europe’s technological and 
related business strengths and in how far such strengths are critical for the functioning of Europe’s 
economy and society. Europe represents a large and wealthy market, has a strong and innovative 
industry, which delivers high quality products and services, and it has several strong innovation 
eco-systems. Fostering such strengths and critical technologies8 is necessary to maintain a strong 
negotiating position in a world in which a major player like the US is moving toward a transactional 
approach to international relations. The actual policies may be both defensive as well as offensive. 
The intention of this third policy approach is to add a position of power to Europe’s international 
relations and negotiations in the field of innovation.    
4) The fourth and final group of complementary policies should focus on identifying and spreading the 
key social values and goals (e.g. in relation to quality of life, quality of labour, culture including 
privacy, and sustainability) that Europe wants to pursue in its internal and external innovation 
policies. Such values and goals can partly be spread to other countries via collaborative activities 
such as in the case of the transfer of European thinking about innovation eco-systems and the 
related smart specialisation strategies (Sanchez, Arrizabalaga, & Mendibil, 2018). International 
collaboration might also be the preferred mechanism to regulate the social impacts of the platform 
economy business and other oligopolistic sectors, but one-sided action could be just as effective, 
as the recent example of GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation) shows. In the case of GDPR 
Europe’s example sets a standard, which finds many global followers. There are also cases where 
some form of force has been used, such as when Bangladesh was exempted from preferential 
trade arrangements with the US and Europe, to force the country to rapidly modernise the labour 
conditions in its textile industries. The societal goals which will drive future European research and 
innovation missions will, together with the UN Sustainable Development Goals, be very good 
starting points to invite other countries to join these missions and pursue similar societal goals.  
It is important to bring these policy directions together in a coherent framework to present a clear future 
oriented vision of what Europe sees as its international role in innovation. With such a vision and the 
supporting policies, the role of Europe on the global platform gains in visibility and strength. The Union’s 
external actions and the foreign and diplomatic services of the member states can become more 
effective when an improvement in the alignment in the field of external innovation policies between 
Member States, key business and other stakeholders and the Union is achieved. Such an action was 
already proposed by vice-president Kaitanen in 2016 (European Commission, 2016) considering the 
                                                      
 
8 Due to the dominance of the neo-liberal economic policy vision and the related generic innovation policies, thinking about 
existing and needed technological strengths is of recent date in Europe. An example can be found in (Reiss & et al, 2016).  
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broader field of economic diplomacy. But according to a Clingendael policy brief (Okano-Heijmans & 
Saverio Montessano, 2016) “EU member state governments and private-sector organizations have 
barely discussed the issue – partly because they remain largely unaware of the increasing EU activism 
and/ or because they do not wish to encourage it.” Over the past two years the interest has grown, not 
in the least because the Trump administration changed the international economic policy environment. 
Hopefully this “wake-up call” enables the development of a shared and coherent framework and of 
coordinated action in Europe. The complexities of applying these points both within and outside the 
European Union are fully acknowledged. It will be a challenge to align the Member States and an even 
greater challenge to apply the proposed points as policy directions in the international and global 
environment. But having such a set of policy directions will then provide the much-needed policy 
guidance to foreign affairs services and to innovation diplomacy.     
 
Postscript: science diplomacy and innovation diplomacy 
 
Throughout this brief it was argued that issues of innovation and competition have gained prominence 
over the collaboration orientation of science diplomacy. With innovation, science has also become an 
issue in the competitive relations between nations. This raises the question if there is still room for a 
view of science as a relatively neutral and authoritative function in society and if there is a special role 
for scientists in international relations. In other words: is it possible and useful to distinguish between 
science diplomacy and innovation diplomacy? In the case of innovation diplomacy, the diplomatic 
activities are clearly there to push science, technology and innovation forward, in the national interest 
or (as in the case of innovation as global public good) in the international or global interest. It is 
“diplomacy for science” (and innovation can be added here) in the terminology of the Royal Society and 
the AAAS (Royal Society and American Association for the Advancement of Science, 2010). But what 
can science do for diplomacy? In line with the “science for diplomacy” thinking, Berkman (Berkman, 
2018) stresses the independent role of science and scientists: “Science is a neutral platform that allows 
for less politically charged dialogues, which in turn create bridges that help overall diplomatic efforts.” 
The classical example which supports this view is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC). Berkman also mentions international Arctic scientific collaboration and SESAME, the Middle 
East’s first major international research centre, designed to host both Israeli and Palestinian scientists. 
Although the conditions for such efforts, which usually take many years to show any political impact as 
the case of the IPCC illustrates (Montalvo & Leijten, 2015), are not getting better under the influence of 
growing competition, nationalism and populism, they remain valuable. In the perspective of responsible 
science and responsible scientists, the efforts to jointly develop scientific insights about shared 
problems and common views on international policy actions, should be welcomed. The world of science 
should, wherever possible, take collaborative action to build such insights and policy views on the many 
issues which transcend national boundaries. The UN sustainable development goals provide a good, 
but by far not the only starting point. The tensions that will arise between the two approaches (neutral 
and independent science diplomacy and competition-oriented innovation diplomacy) might very well be 
turned into socially productive insights and actions (see for example (Tatalovic, 2018)). 
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